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within your reach, which would qualify or explain away the charge
under investigation, it will be your duty to order such evidence to be
produced." Other federal court decisions60 have upheld this charge.
But the person against whom the bill is brought may not be compelled
to appear and give testimony against himself,61 this protection being
reserved to him by the Fifth Amendment.
It is apparent from the preceding discussion that the grand jury
system, as adopted in the various states of this country, has, in many
instances, undergone changes which have lessened in some respects and
enlarged in others the powers vested in the grand jury under the com-
mon law. In some jurisdictions its full powers have been clearly set
out by statutes. In other jurisdictions judicial decisions have pro-
vided fairly clear definitions of this body's authority. There are but
few North Carolina authorities which may be relied upon to inform
the courts or the grand jurors themselves of the grand jury's power to
proceed on its own initiative. The existence of situations in which
there are variances of opinion, as to the grand jury's authority to make,
of its own motion, investigations and reports on matters coming to its
attention, is thus easily understood. In order that it successfully fulfill
its obligation to protect and uphold the morals and welfare of society,
the grand jury must be clearly and accurately informed of its powers
to perform these duties. We need clear and definitive legislative enact-
ments to supplenent the now scant and obscure authorities on this
point.
FRANK THOMAS MILLER, JR.
Ejectment-Common Source Rule-
Surface and Mineral Rights.
An action was brought to establish P's mineral rights in a tract of
land, the surface rights of which were admittedly in D. D denied P's
title and alleged title in himself by virtue of twenty years adverse
possession of the mineral rights or seven years adverse possession under
color of title. P offered evidence that in 1912 the land was claimed in
fee by the Toe River Land and Mining Co. P then showed that in that
year the land had been conveyed with reservation and exception of the
mineral rights, and that through mesne conveyances from the Toe River
Land and Mining Co. he had derived such title as that company had
reserved to these mineral rights. The surface rights had been conveyed
several times, each time with reservation and exception of the mineral
right, until in 1918 D's immediate grantor had conveyed the tract to
"o See United States v. Kilpatrick, 16 Fed. 765, 772 (W. D. N. C. 1883) ; United
States v. Terry, 39 Fed. 355, 362 (N. D. Cal. 1889); Carroll v. United States,
16 F. (2d) 951, 953 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927).
'HoussL & WALSER, op. cit. supra note 9, §230.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
D in fee simple, with neither reservation nor exception. D offered
some evidence of adverse possession. The trial judge charged the jury
that P had offered sufficient evidence of title to be declared the owner
of the mineral interest unless D had acquired title by adverse possession,
and that the burden of proving adverse possession was upon D. There
was a verdict and judgment for P, and D appealed. Held, the trial
court erred in charging the jury that P's evidence was sufficient to estab-
lish good paper title.' Although' it was not pointed out by the court,
there is no doubt that P-would have won if he had traced his title back
to the state, or proved title in himself or in his original grantor by
some other method than by reliance on the common source rule-assum-
ing that D had not in fact- been in adverse possession as he alleged.2
In this note the term "ejectment" will be used to refer to the
common law action of ejectment or its modem substitute, the action to
establish one's title in land and to obtain possession.$ In North Caro-
lina ejectment may be maintained only by one having title.4 Prior
peaceable possession is not sufficient. 5 In order to establish title in him-
self, the plaintiff may use any one of several methods listed and sanc-
tioned by the North Carolina court in case after case. 6 One of these
methods is embodied in the "common source" rule. The plaintiff traces
the defendant's title back to a common source with his own and then
shows that his claim from that source is better than that of the defend-
ant. According to the rule, when the plaintiff and the defendant claim
title to the same tract of land and each traces his claim back to a common
grantor, each is precluded from denying the title of that common grant-
or.7 If, however, it is shown8 that the two parties claim different
'Vance v. Pritchard, 213 N. C. 552, 197 S. E. 182 (1938).
'Once a plaintiff has shown paper title in himself it will be presumed that
the defendant holds in subordination to him, and the burden of proving title by
adverse possession will be cast upon the defendant. N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie,
1935) §432, Johnson v. Pate, 83 N. C. 110 (1880), Blue Ridge Land Co. v.
Floyd, 171 N. C. 543, 88 S. E. 862 (1916), Virginia-Carolina Power Co. v.
Taylor, 194 N. C. 231, 139 S. E. 381 (1927).
'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §399; MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE (1929) §§87, 97(8). As there is considerable conflict among
the different jurisdictions as to the elements of ownership necessary to maintain
an action of ejectment, this note is confined largely to the rule prevailing in
North Carolina.
"Cowles v. Ferguson, 90 N. C. 308 (1884) ; Mobley v. Griffin, 104 N. C. 112,
10 S. E. 142 (1889); Sinclair v. Huntley, 131 N. C. 243, 42 S. E. 605 (1902) ;
Bryan v. Hodges, 151 N. C. 413, 66 S. E. 345 (1909); Moore v. Miller, 179
N. C. 396, 102 S. E. 627 (1920); McINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND
PRoczD RE (1929) §382; notes (1938) 16 N. C. L. Rxv. 306, (1928) 16 Ky.
L. J. 353.
'Sheppard v. Sheppard, 4 N. C. 545 (1817); Duncan v. Duncan, 25 N. C.
317 (1843).
" Mobley v. Griffin, 104 N. C. 112, 10 S. E. 142 (1889); Moore v. Miller,
179 N. C. 396, 102 S. E. 627 (1920) ; Howell v. Shaw, 183 N. C. 460, 112 S. E.
38 (1922); MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1929) §157.
'Newlin v. Osborne, 47 N. C. 164 (1855) ; Prevatt v. Harrelson, 132 N. C. 250,
43 S. E. 800 (1903) ; Howell v. Shaw, 183 N. C. 460, 112 S. E. 38 (1922) ; Biggs
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estates from the same grantor, the rule cannot be invoked.9 Actually the
common source doctrine is not a means of establishing title, but is in
the nature of an exception to the general rule that in ejectment the
plaintiff cannot win on the weakness of the defendant's title. The pur-
pose is to relieve the plaintiff in ejectment of the necessity of proving
title good as against all the world, which might involve the expense
and labor of tracing title back to the state, when the defendant's only
claim to the property is from the same source as the plaintiff's. 10
As ejectment is the proper remedy to establish title and get pos-
session of land, so it is also the proper method by which to establish
mineral rights by one out of possession." It is very generally held
that surface and mineral rights may be severed, and once this is done
they become separate and distinct freehold estates.12 Either may be
conveyed separately, 13 leased separately,' 4 or taxed separately without
in anyway affecting title to the other.15 Nor will adverse possession
of one affect the title to the other.'8
With these principles in mind, we now turn to a consideration of
the principal case in order to determine whether the common source rule
is applicable to the facts thereof. In an earlier North Carolina case,
v. Oxendine, 207 N. C. 601, 178 S. E. 216 (1935); NEwELL, EJECTMENT (1892)
579.8 If the plaintiff brings an action of ejectment and the defendant makes no
claim of title but enters a general denial, the plaintiff may then show that the
defendant is holding under a deed which may be traced to a common grantor and,
thereby, invoke the common source rule. MCINToSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRAC-
TIcE AND PRocEDuRE (1929) §§382(1), 461(7). He may do this, even though
the defendant, in his answer, does not claim title from any particular source,
because a person in possession of property and having a deed to the same is
presumed to claim under the deed. See Bailey v. Carleton, 12 N. H. 9, 15
(1841); Ryan v. Martin, 91 N. C. 464, 469 (1884).
See Ryan v. Martin, 91 N. C. 464, 469 (1884) ; Drake v. Howell, 133 N. C.
163, 167, 45 S. E. 539, 540 (1903); Hill v. Hill, 176 N. C. 194, 197, 96 S. E.
958. 959 (1918).
" See Frey v. Ramsour, 66 N. C. 466, 472 (1872); Christenbury v. King,
85 N. C. 230, 234 (1881); Ryan v. Martin, 91 N. C. 464, 469 (1884); note(1920) 7 A. L. R. 860, 866.
"See Mentone Hotel & Realty Co. v. Taylor, 161 Ga. 237, 241, 130 S. E. 527,
529 (1925); NEWELL, EJECTMENT (1892) 36, 37; SEDGWICK AND WAIT, TRIAL
OF TITLE TO LAND (2d ed. 1886) §§108, 116.
'Hartwell v. Camman, 10 N. J. Eq. 128 (Ch. 1854); Outlaw v. Gray, 163
N. C. 325, 79 S. E. 676 (1913); Gill v. Fletcher, 74 Ohio St. 295, 78 N. E.
433 (1906) ; Morrison v. American Ass'n, Inc., 110 Va. 91, 65 S. E. 469 (1909) ;
Wallace v. Elm Grove Coal Co., 58 W. Va. 449, 52 S. E. 485 (1905) ; 1 TIFFANY,
REL. PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) 867.
1Outlaw v. Gray, 163 N. C. 325, 79 S. E. 676 (1913); 1 TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) 867.
1 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) 868.
'Notes (1931) 75 A. L. R. 416, 434, (1926) 4 CAN. B. REv. 405.
"Bodcaw Lumber Co. v. Goode, 160 Ark. 48, 254 S. W. 345 (1923) ; Hoilman
v. Johnson, 164 N. C. 268, 80 S. E. 249 (1913) ; Armstrong v. Caldwell, 53 Pa.
284 (1866) ; Morrison v. American Ass'n, Inc., 110 Va. 91, 65 S. E. 469 (1909) ;
2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) 1993; notes (1932) 11 N. C. L. REv.
105, (1930) 19 Ky. L. J. 74.
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Fisher v. Cid Copper Mining Co.,"' the plaintiff, as heir at law of X,
sought to recover possession as owner of the mineral rights beneath the
surface of a tract of land. The surface rights had been conveyed by X
in his lifetime and were held by the defendant through mesne convey-
ances at the time the action was brought. The plaintiff contended that
X was the common source of title of both the defendant and himself,
and, hence, the defendant was estopped to deny the title of the common
grantor in the reserved as well as in the conveyed estates. The court
rejected this view, saying: "The conveyed and reserved parts are not
one and the same thing. The grantor may have had, himself, only an
estate in the land to transfer, while the reserved minerals may have
belonged to another. Precisely such were the relations of the succeeding
owners, each being capable of passing an estate in the land and not in
the mineral deposits below the surface. -The estoppel is necessarily con-
fined to the subject matter of the conveyance to which conflicting claims
are asserted."' 8  The only distinction between this decision and the
principal case is that in the latter the defendant claimed the mineral
rights under color of title. If P had sued D's immediate grantor in
ejectment, the case would have been on "all fours" with the Fisher
case, and a similar decision would naturally have been expected. If
this be true, what effect does the fact that D, who claims under the
immediate grantor, "can only show color of title to the mineral interests
by attaching such claim to the chain which shows the title to the sur-
face' have upon the situation? This, it seems, is the most important
question in the case. The exact point does not appear to have been
decided either in North Carolina or elsewhere. The argument might
be advanced that D derived all the title that he claimed from his immedi-
ate grantor, who, in turn, derived all the title he had to convey from
the original and alleged common source, and hence D's claim to the
minerals is so closely connected with his claim to the surface that it
should preclude him from denying the original grantor's title. D,
claiming the entire fee under a deed from his immediate grantor, would
be estopped to deny the title of that grantor.' 9 Would this estoppel
apply as to all grantors in the chain as far back as the original severor,
and thus deprive D of a defense which would have been available to his
immediate grantor? The dissenting opinion takes the view that it
would. But such an argument is not sound when examined carefully.
It was seen in the Fisher case that a person who takes a deed which
conveys surface rights only, does not admit the grantor's title to
mineral rights, and is not precluded from denying such title. No more
should a person who takes a deed to the whole fee without reservation,
1794 N. C. 397 (1886). 11Id. at 400.
"' NEWELL, EJECTMENT (1892) 590.
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where his immediate grantor held a deed conveying only the surface
rights, be precluded from denying the title of the remote grantor of the
surface rights, to the mineral rights. It is not impossible that the im-
mediate grantor had title to both surface and mineral rights, acquiring
title to each from a different source.
The North Carolina court has indicated that the common source
rule is not strictly based upon an estoppel in this state, as it is said
to be in other jurisdictions. 20  In Rya v. Martin,2 1 Merrimon, J.,
speaking for the court, said: "The conclusion thus established between
the parties is not strictly and technically an estoppel, but it is in the
nature of and has the practical effect of an estoppel. This rule of law
is founded in justice and convenience. .. ." The dissenting opinion
makes much of this supposed distinction. It is submitted that if under
a given set of facts the courts of other states apply what they term an
estoppel and reach a certain result, and the North Carolina court with
the same set of facts goes through the identical process to reach the
same result but calls its rule one of justice and convenience, there is no
real distinction, certainly no distinction such as would call for a differ-
ent result in the principal case.
The court's decision seems correct, being merely an application of
the age-old North Carolina rule that in an action of ejectment, the plain-
tiff must win on the strength of his own title, and not on the defendant's
weakness. 22 The apparent hardship of the present decision may yet be
remedied provided that on the new trial which the court granted, P
changes his line of attack and establishes his title in another way. D
should not be allowed to plead res adjudicata,23 because the supreme
court did not finally pass upon the issue involved, but merely granted
a new trial because of an error of substantive law in the trial judge's




Intervener's assignor sold an automobile in South Carolina under
a duly recorded conditional sale contract. The purchaser, having col-
lided with plaintiff in Virginia while en route to Baltimore, had judg-
ment rendered against him'by a Virginia court, and the sale of the
automobile was ordered in satisfaction thereof. Intervener then inter-
' Jennings v. Marston, 121 Va. 79, 92 S. E. 821 (1917), 7 A. L. 1_ 860 (1920),
291 N. C. 464, 469 (1884).
'Carson v. Jenkins, 206 N. C. 475, 174 S. E. 271 (1934); see Sinclair v.
Huntley, 131 N. C. 243, 245, 42 S. E. 605 (1902) ; Bettis v. Avery, 140 N. C. 184,
192, 52 S. E. 584, 586 (1905) ; Virginia-Carolina Power Co. v. Taylor, 194 N. C.
231, 233, 139 S. E. 381, 383 (1927).
12 BLACK, THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS (1891) §§650, 654, 683, 684.
